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Abstract:

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CentrePiece Article
 Regulatory reform in Greece: the benefits of removing maximum mark-ups
 Christos Genakos, Pantelis Koutroumpis and Mario Pagliero November 2015
Paper No' CEPCP456:
Full Paper (pdf)

CentrePiece 20 (2) Autumn 2015

Tags: markup regulation; focal point; collusion; ex-post policy evaluation

Regulations that impose maximum mark-ups are intended to protect consumers from firms exercising market power. But a study by Christos Genakos and colleagues suggests that they can have the opposite effect: when Greece lifted controls on the market for fresh fruit and vegetables in June 2011, consumers enjoyed lower prices.

This article summarises 'The Impact of Maximum Mark-up Regulation on Prices' by Christos Genakos, Pantelis Koutroumpis and Mario Pagliero, CEP Discussion Paper No. 1310
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